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ABSTRACT 
When do states turn to the United Nations Security Council? Today the term threat to 
peace is interpreted more widely than ever before ranging from inter-state conflict over 
internal wars to humanitarian crisis. Alarming the Security Council to international cri-
sis is an exceptional foreign policy choice. By far more conflicts are not brought to the 
attention of the Security Council than are put before that body. The paper explores when 
states actually turn to the Security Council and term a crisis a threat to international 
peace. 
One the one hand, the Security the Council has assumed a much more visible and ac-
tive role in international dispute settlement since the end of the Cold War. On the other 
hand, the unilateral decision of the United States to invade Iraq raised serious doubts 
about the legitimacy and effectiveness of the UN’s collective security system. A much 
repeated truism reminds UN scholars that any system of collective security can be only 
as good as its members want it to be. But so far we do not have a clear understanding of 
what its members do want it to be. While the option to involve the UN Security Council 
in any situation endangering peace is equally open to all states, only some states address 
the UN in some conflict situations. From this starting point, this paper contributes to the 
understanding of the role of the UN in fostering conflict resolution as well as shedding 
light on foreign policy choices by states. 
In what situations do states turn to the Security Council? Which states take the deci-
sion to alert the Council? And what do states want from the Council once they did? Ad-
dressing these questions, the paper presents instances in which states decided to turn to 
the Security Council. The systematic assessment builds on a set of case studies that in-
cludes different types of conflict situations in the 1990s as well as different states. States 
bring crisis situations before the Council which they either perceive as an immediate 
threat to themselves or as a threat to norms shared by the international community. The 
paper concludes with some generalizations about reasons for states to turn to the UN 
Security Council. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Today, international law and international norms govern more and more issue areas of 
international relations. Especially noteworthy are developments in the realm of interna-
tional security. On the one hand, no other area of international relations seems to be so 
resistant to enhanced interstate cooperation and effective international governance like 
security. States hold on to conventional notions of sovereignty and guard their national 
interests. On the other hand, the United Nations Security Council enjoys a far more 
prominent role now than it did during the cold war years (Wallensteen/Johansson 2004). 
Security Council resolutions aim to contribute to international governance by calling for 
an end to internal wars, enforcing non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
enhancing human rights, imposing arms embargoes, freezing assets of alleged terrorists, 
and generally averting international crisis situations. The increased activities of the UN 
Security Council have become a prominent subject of study for international relations 
and international law scholars. Studies mirror the widening range of the Security Coun-
cil’s workload. For instance, there are studies on the interpretations of the concept of 
threats to peace (Österdahl 1998, Wellens 2003), on legislative functions assumed by 
the Council (Szasz 2002, Talmon 2005), on the authorization of the use of force (Blok-
ker 2000, Sarooshi 1999), and on judicial review of Council decisions (Alvarez 1996, 
Akande 1997). Additionally, case studies investigate decision-making in the Council in 
specific crisis situations (Melvern 2001, Malone 1998). Recurring questioning of the 
Council’s legitimacy and policies do not contradict this finding. On the contrary, these 
doubts and current reform proposals are a reflection on the increasing importance of the 
Security Council. 
In sum, dispute settlement and crisis management seem to be more internationalized 
than ever before. Consequently, the UN Security Council is well on the way to become 
a centerpiece of international security governance structures. This development is a sign 
of an ongoing internationalization of security issues. On the other side of the coin there 
seems to be less state autonomy accompanied by an unraveling of traditional concepts 
of state sovereignty for at least some states. Do states drive the internationalization of 
security matters or are states at the receiving end of this process? 
Curiously little scholarly attention is devoted to the question why states seek to in-
volve the Security Council in handling international crises.1 So far, existing studies 
                                                 
1  One noteworthy exception is the work by Alexander Thompson (2006) who argues states channel (coercive) 
policies through the Security Council to signal benign intentions to foreign leaders and foreign publics. On a gen-
eral level Abott/Snidal (1998) argue states act through formal international organizations because they feature 
centralization and independence and these properties facilitate interstate cooperation. 
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mostly capture in which circumstances the respective Council member states agree that 
a crisis put to them is indeed a threat to international security. But it is not only the Se-
curity Council that has an important role in making these determinations. Prior to a 
Council decision, there is usually a state alerting the body to crisis. This paper explores 
the specific circumstances in which a state chooses to turn to the UN Security Council. 
To what type of situations do states draw the attention of the Security Council? What 
are the circumstances in which states decide to turn to the Security Council? And which 
elements of situations are termed a threat to international peace and security by states? 
Once we can answer these kinds of questions we will have a better understanding of 
what states want of the United Nations and to which end states use this organization. 
The next section presents the analytical framework to meet these questions. The follow-
ing four sections introduce and discuss the empirical findings. The final conclusion de-
rives some generalizations. States draw the Security Council’s attention to crisis if they 
perceive themselves under immediate threat or if they are concerned about a violation of 
community norms. 
2 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
This paper undertakes an explorative study of instances in which states alerted the UN 
Security Council to international crisis. The aim of this paper is to gain insights from a 
descriptive approach. Before tackling the task of providing a theoretical informed ex-
planation why states decide to turn to the UN Security Council, it is necessary to gather 
empirical data on the circumstances in which states turn to the Council. Another point 
also merits attention: which elements of a crisis do states find to be a threat to interna-
tional security? 
Any state can draw the attention of the Security Council to any situation or any dis-
pute which may lead to international friction (Art. 35 UN Charter). It is not even neces-
sary for the state to be a member of the United Nations to do so. Yet only states are al-
lowed to refer situations to the Security Council.2 The Council may then take up the 
referred matter, but does not have to. The body consists of five permanent members 
(China, France, Russia, UK, and USA) and ten additional members elected on a rotating 
basis. Delegates to the Council are state envoys who represent their respective country’s 
foreign policy. Due to rotation, each year different states are represented in the Security 
Council. Informal voting rules provide for some geographical diversity in membership. 
                                                 
2  The UN Charter also grants the UN Secretary-General the right to bring any matter which may threaten interna-
tional peace to the attention of the Security Council. So strictly speaking there is one individual in the world who 
in his professional capacity may refer crisis situations to the Council. 
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While the option to involve the UN Security Council in any situation endangering 
peace is equally open to all states, only some states address the UN in some conflict 
situations. For instance, the breakdown of the cease-fire in Sri Lanka has not been 
brought before the Security Council. Indeed by far more conflicts are not brought to the 
attention of the Security Council than are brought before it. This fact becomes apparent 
when comparing the number of active armed conflicts to the Security Council agenda. 
While the Council dealt notably with more conflicts in the 1990s than ever before, there 
is still a wide gap between the number of conflicts in a given year and the number of 
conflicts in which the Council was involved (Wallensteen/Johansson 2004: 26). This 
gap is more than a reflection of the increased workload of the Council and a resulting 
need for self-restraint.  
Many conflicts are not on the Council’s agenda because no state cared to alert the 
Council to them. The circumstances and thereby the type of crisis that states do refer to 
the Council need to be studied. Do these situations share some common characteristic? 
This study will give some background on each crisis situation that states brought to the 
Security Council. Starting point for the empirical investigations are complaints in which 
states expressed the concern a situation was threatening international peace and security. 
States raise such concerns in letters to either the President of the Security Council or the 
UN Secretary-General. These complaints have the status of official UN documents and 
can be accessed in UN archives. Complaints studied in this paper were identified ac-
cording to two more criteria: The complaints were made in the 1990s. Looking at states’ 
choices in the post-Cold War environment, one can reasonably expect that states do not 
merely use the Security Council as a sounding board for ideological differences. Sec-
ond, at least one OECD country is involved in the situation brought to the Council. That 
state can either have accused some other state of threatening the peace or be itself the 
target of such an accusation. Applying these criteria fifteen instances were identified.3 It 
might be worthwhile to point out that cases have been chosen only according to these 
criteria and uneven distributions of complaints over the years merely reflect historic 
reality. 
There is no formal definition what kind of crisis constitutes a threat to international 
peace in the sense of the UN Charter. As the Charter is deliberately open to changing 
notions of security threats, each state is free to call any situation a threat to international 
peace. And indeed there is a wide range of issues that appear as threats to states. In their 
complaints states spell out quite specifically which elements of the situations they per-
ceive as threat. Terming a situation a threat to peace is a deliberate choice. It marks a 
                                                 
3  Three additional incidents were not included in this study for pragmatic reasons. For instance, a French complaint 
about the situation in Afghanistan from the mid-1990s could not be traced to a certain incident. 
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line diplomats do not cross by accident. Should the Security Council endorse the view, 
the door is open to the full range of Security Council decisions including enforcement 
measures. While a less severe wording by a state does not preclude the Council finding 
the situation a threat to peace anyway, that state’s intentions are less clear. The focus on 
conflicts with alleged implications for world peace is an analytical concentration on 
situations that caused great concerns to states. The underlying assumption is that when 
states formally express their concern in the language of Article 39 of the UN Charter, 
they are seriously interested in involving the Security Council. Additionally to the cir-
cumstances, this paper will elaborate which elements of each situation were termed a 
threat to peace. More likely than not, there are additional reasons next to those stated in 
a complaint for states to turn to the Security Council. Nevertheless, this study is mainly 
interested in those made explicit by states.  
The empirical data is organized in four sections. Each section deals with a different 
cluster of crisis situations. Clusters are formed according to the issues that prompted 
states to turn to the Security Council: (1) war, (2) humanitarian crisis, (3) enforcing 
non-proliferation, and (4) unique incidents. These clusters provide an ordering principle 
for the following presentation of instances in which states alerted the Security Council 
to a crisis. The clusters have not perfect selectivity. They make analytical sense none-
theless. War will always cause suffering among civilians and most likely create humani-
tarian crisis. Seeking to understand when states alarm the UN Security Council, it 
makes sense to investigate what aspect of a crisis leads states to be alarmed. Being con-
cerned about the humanitarian condition caused by a conflict is different from being 
concerned about the fact of fighting. This is especially so since the concept of humani-
tarian intervention increasingly gains acceptance as grounds to use military force. 
3 WAR 
On the one hand, war seems to be the most obvious event to cause states to alarm the 
Security Council. After all a war is the strongest disturbance of international peace and 
security.4 At least this view is true if one does not take the position that not every war is 
endangering world peace. On the other hand, outbreak of war is also a clear sign that the 
maintenance of international security has failed. Ideally, states should alarm the Secu-
rity Council to crisis, that is before war commences. Empirically, not every war triggers 
state complaints alleging a threat to peace. For instance, the Vietnam War did not, even 
though superpower involvement implied a great danger to world peace. During the 
1990s four wars made states turn to the Security Council.  
                                                 
4  The applied definition of ‚war’ is based on shared traits used by various data sets on armed conflicts. War then is 
a militarized conflict between at least one state and another political entity with centrally organized fighting. 
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US-intervention in Panama (Nicaragua) 
Interestingly, it was Nicaragua that protested against the US invasion of Panama.5 On 20 
December 1990 the United States intervened militarily in Panama. Assaults on US ser-
vicemen had triggered the intervention that actually aimed at arresting Panama’s mili-
tary dictator General M.A. Noriega. The United States had tried a mix of negotiations, 
sanctions, military threats and support for insurgencies to oust Noriega from office 
(Gilboa 1995/96). Noriega had been under critique for illegal narcotics and arms trade, 
two US courts had indicted him for drug trafficking and money laundering in 1988. In 
May 1989 Noriega annulled the results of free elections won by opposition parties.6 
Later that year a coup d’état failed and Panama’s national assembly even declared 
(symbolically) war on the United States. So when US servicemen were assaulted in late 
1989 the US government had finally found a justification for an intervention.7  
On the day the US operation Just Cause commenced, Nicaragua alerted the UN Se-
curity Council to the invasion. Nicaragua initially asked for an urgent Council meeting.8 
The United States reported on the same day to the Council they had taken action in Pa-
nama in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter (self-defence).9 After a Security 
Council meeting and discussion of the invasion in the UN General Assembly Nicaragua 
turned again to the Security Council. This time Nicaragua considered “the invasion and 
current occupation of the Republic of Panama by US troops […] a serious threat to 
peace and security in the region.”10 In that letter Nicaragua complained about the tempo-
rary occupation of residences of Nicaraguan diplomats in Panama. 
Invasion of Kuwait (United States and others) 
In the early hours of 2 August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait after failed border talks. Iraq 
had attempted several times to integrate Kuwait in its territory. Iraq had accepted Ku-
                                                 
5  US forces entered Panama in December 1989, but Nicaragua did not charge the US with endangering interna-
tional security until January 1990. Nicaragua did alert the Council on the day of the invasion but did not yet term 
the events a threat to peace. 
6   The elections had only taken place after intensive international lobbying. The opposition’s victory has been veri-
fied by international election monitors. 
7   Contingency planning for intervention in Panama had started in November 1987 (von Hippel 2000: 35). Official 
aims were (1) protection of US citizens, (2) restoration of democracy (3) preservation of the Panama Canal treaty 
and (4) arrest of Noriega. 
8  Letter from the Representative of Nicaragua to the President of the Security Council, dated 20.12.1989, S/21034. 
9  Letter from the Representative of the United States to the President of the Security Council, dated 20.12.1989, 
S721035. 
10   Letter from the Representative of Nicaragua to the President of the Security Council, dated 03.01.1990, S/21066. 
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waiti independence in 1963 but did not agree to the border demarcation. The most dis-
puted issue was the right to exploit the Rumaila oil field. In the 1980s Kuwait had 
granted Iraq interest-free credits for financing Iraq’s war against Iran. The resulting 
Iraqi debt in combination with falling crude oil prices triggered a financial crisis in Iraq 
in the beginning of 1990. Iraq accused Kuwait of illegal exploitation of the Rumaila 
field and of cheating on OPEC quotas. Iraq demanded of Kuwait to cancel the Iraqi 
debts. In July 1990 Iraq declared the Kuwaiti behavior (oil theft and quota cheating) 
amounted to a military attack against Iraq and threatened retaliation. Some Arabic states 
as well as the UN Secretary-General tried to mediate between the two countries. In re-
sponse to an Egyptian effort Kuwait agreed to lower its oil production.11 Both sides also 
agreed to talks on border limitation. These talks failed on their first day because Kuwait 
was unwilling to cancel the Iraqi debt and to cede part of its territory. Iraq then invaded 
Kuwait. 
Only few hours after the start of the invasion, the United States called for an imme-
diate Security Council meeting “in light of the invasion of Kuwait”.12 During the day 
Italy, Japan, and Iran followed suit. The European Community states condemned the 
use of force and termed the Iraqi aggression “a dangerous threat to peace and stability in 
the region”.13 In the following days - already after the first formal Security Council 
meeting - many other states also expressed their concern to the Security Council about 
the Iraqi invasion. 
Breakup of Yugoslavia – Croatia (Canada, Austria, Hungary) 
In the summer of 1991 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia began to unravel. On 25 
June 1991 Croatia declared its independence and annulled the Federal constitution. 
Clashes between newly put together Croatian forces and the Yugoslav army quickly 
turned into war. At first Western European states considered war so close to their bor-
ders to be best dealt with by European diplomats. The first European Community bro-
kered ceasefire failed. Renewed attempts to settle the dispute at The Hague Peace Con-
ference were also followed by reports of armistice violations by both sides in mid-
September 1991. 
                                                 
11  Los Angeles Daily News, 26.07.1990: N22. 
12  Letter from the Representative of the United States to the President of the Security Council, dated 02.08.1990, 
S/21424; Kuwait had also immediately asked for a Security Council meeting in letter to the President of the Secu-
rity Council, dated 02.08.1990, S/21423. 
13  Letter from the Italian Chargé d’affaires to the UN Secretary-General transmitting statement by EC member 
states, dated 02.08.1990, S/21426. 
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Only days after The Hague armistice agreement Canada alerted the Security Council 
to the deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia. Canada requested an urgent Council meet-
ing as “the continuation [of the situation] is likely to endanger the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security.14 Austria asked for informal Council consultations on the 
same day.15 Hungary requested a Council meeting the next day but was even more con-
cerned. In Hungary’s view the “deteriorating situation regarding Yugoslavia […] poses 
a threat to international peace and security”.16 
Breakup of Yugoslavia – Bosnia (Austria, France) 
Fighting in Croatia eventually spread to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia was the third 
Yugoslav republic striving for independence. War in Croatia made it impossible for the 
ethnically diverse government in Sarajevo to continue. Bosnian Muslims preferred an 
integrated and independent state of Bosnia, Croats living in Bosnia wanted to join the 
newly independent Croatia, and the Bosnian Serbs wished to stay part of Yugoslavia. 
The then Bosnian President Izetbegovic asked the UN Secretary-General for a UN 
peace-keeping force as early as winter 1991/92 but to no avail. Mediation efforts by the 
European Community resulted in the Lisbon Conference (22/23.2.1992). All parties 
accepted the Cutileiro proposal that envisaged an administrative partition of Bosnia-
Herzegovina in three parts while maintaining the current external border of the republic. 
But shortly after the conference the Bosnian side withdrew its support for the proposal. 
A vast majority voted for Bosnian independence in a referendum about a week later. 
(The Bosnian Serbs boycotted the vote.) On 3 March 1992 Bosnia declared itself inde-
pendent. The Serbs responded by proclaiming a Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Rising tensions resulted in clashes in the second half of 1991. In spring 1992 the Bos-
nian Serbs started a military campaign on Bosnian territory – by then full-out war. Bos-
nian Serbs and parts of the federal army on one side fought Bosnian Muslim and Croats 
on the other side.  
The EC brokered a cease-fire in mid-April 1992, but fighting continued. Austria 
alarmed the UN Security Council to Serb attacks against Bosnia. It called on the Coun-
cil to “to take appropriate steps” to end the violence. Austria specifically accused the 
Yugoslav National Army of “aggression against [Bosnia’s] independence and territorial 
integrity […] endangering international peace and security, thereby violating fundamen-
                                                 
14  Letter from the Representative of Canada to the President of the Security Council, dated 19.09.1991, S/23053. 
The contorted wording is a close echoing of Article 33 UN Charter. 
15  Letter from the Representative of Austria to the President of the Security Council, dated 20.09.1991, S/23052. 
16  Letter from the Representative of Hungary to the President of the Security Council, dated 20.09.1991, S/23057. 
See also S/23058. 
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tal principles of the Charter of the United Nations”. 17 On the following day, the foreign 
ministers of Germany, France and Poland decided after consultations “to request an 
urgent meeting of the Security Council in order to call upon the Council to assume its 
responsibilities with respect to Bosnia-Herzegovina”.18  
 
States perceived all these four wars as a threat to international peace and security. How-
ever, these wars do not share common characteristics. Obviously the two conflicts 
stemming from the break-up of Yugoslavia are interlinked, though. The states that drew 
the Security Council’s attention to Croatia and Bosnia seemed more concerned about 
the fighting itself than the break-up of Yugoslavia in their complaint letters. Especially 
for the European states involving the Security Council can be seen as a way of delegat-
ing responsibility. At first, the European Community endeavored to foster conflict reso-
lution but in the light of its sparse impact, bringing the matter to the Security Council 
was a strategy to enhance the international efforts to stop the fighting. While territorial 
integrity was not the main concern with regard to Croatia and Bosnia, it was an impor-
tant reason for states to protest against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. In this instance, 
many states, among them the United States, strongly protested the Iraqi invasion to 
demonstrate that sovereign states had the right to exist and to territorial integrity.19 Turn-
ing to the Security Council was the initial step to organize a collective response against 
Iraq. Nicaragua’s main concern in the Panama case was the fact that the United States 
intervened in Central America. Nicaragua had suffered from extensive US interventions 
in its own political system and was therefore very outspoken against any US interven-
tions in the region. Nicaragua brought the matter before the Council to criticize the 
United States. 
4 HUMANITARIAN CRISIS 
Health and/or safety for a large group of people are at stake in humanitarian crises situa-
tions. Such a crisis might be triggered by natural or technological disasters, epidemics, 
famine, armed conflict, or a mix of such events. Starting in the 1990s, international se-
curity is increasingly linked to the protection of human rights and wellbeing. The con-
cept of ‘human security’ gained popularity (Paris 2001). States increasingly alert the 
Security Council to humanitarian crisis situations connected to armed conflict. The term 
                                                 
17  Letter from the Representative of Austria to the President of the Security Council, dated 23.04.1992, S/23833. 
18  Letter from the Representative of France to the President of the Security Council, dated 24.04.1992, S/23838. 
19  On the evolution of the territorial integrity norm see Zacher 2001. Note that Zacher does not consider the dissolu-
tion of Yugoslavia in its republics as change to the norm (p.227, 235), but as proof for the territorial integrity of 
intrastate boundaries. 
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is most popular in relation to internal wars – situations traditionally not considered a 
matter for the Security Council. In this sense highlighting civilian suffering can be seen 
as a way around traditional limits to Security Council involvement (Roberts 1993: 
444/45). The fate of a group of humans in a war-torn country becomes a matter of con-
cern to the international community. Three incidents fall in this category.  
Iraqi civilian population (France, Germany) 
In the aftermath of the international coalition’s war on Iraq to liberate Kuwait, Kurds in 
Iraq’s North and Shiite groups in the South rose up against the Saddam Hussein gov-
ernment in March 1991. The insurgents were speedily defeated by government cam-
paigns causing large-scale refugee flows. The Kurdish population fled to the mountains 
on the Iranian and Turkish border. The Shiites sought protection in the Southern marsh-
lands. The refugees lacked shelter, food, and medical supplies. 
In early April Turkey informed the UN Security Council of approximately 220,000 
Iraqi citizens massed along the Iraqi-Turkish border due to Iraqi army actions. “It is 
apparent that the Iraqi Government forces are deliberately pressing these people toward 
the Turkish border in order to drive them out of their country. These actions violate all 
norms of behavior towards civilian populations and constitute an excessive use of force 
and a threat to the region’s peace and security.”20 Turkey requested an immediate meet-
ing of the Security Council. France also requested a Council meeting “to discuss the 
serious situation resulting from the abuses being committed against the Iraqi population 
in several parts of Iraq, and more particularly in the Kurdish-inhabited areas. By virtue 
of its repercussions in the region, this situation constitutes a threat to international peace 
and security.“21  
In May 1991 the Iraqi government resumed plans to drain the southern Al-Hammar 
marshlands. The government seemed to care less about improvements of the infrastruc-
ture but more about driving away the local (and refugee) population: several towns were 
fired at and bombed (Trautner 1996). Germany was alarmed by reports of „brutal acts of 
repression against the civilian population that area” and in turn alerted the Security 
Council to the situation.22 But it took over a year until the situations of civilians was 
brought again to the Security Council. In early August 1992 France, the United King-
dom and the United States complained about “the continuing repression of the civilian 
                                                 
20  Letter from the Representative of Turkey to the President of the Security Council, dated 02.04.1991, S/22435. 
21  Letter from the French Chargé d’affaires to the President of the Security Council, dated 04.04.1991, S/22442. 
22  Letter from the German foreign minister to the UN Secretary-General, dated 13.06.1991, S/22701. 
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population in many parts of Iraq”. All three states requested a Council meeting and 
termed the Iraqi situation a threat to peace and international security.23 
Genocide in Rwanda (France) 
The international community was slow to respond to the genocide taking place in 
Rwanda. The horrid events were preceded by a long conflict between Hutu and Tutsi. 
Commonly put in terms of ethnic conflict the causes stem from social-economic status 
differences of these two groups fortified by colonial rule. Since independence Hutus 
dominated Rwandan government. In 1990 civil war broke out between government 
forces and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) made up of Tutsi and opposition Hutu. 
The United Nations monitored a cease-fire agreement reached in 1992 and a renewed 
agreement in 1993. When the Rwandese President Habyarimana died in a plane crash 
on 6 April 1994 massive unrests occurred. Hutu groups started killing Tutsi and opposi-
tional Hutu in the capital Kigali. The massacres then spread throughout the entire coun-
try. 
There were informal Security Council discussions on the massacres since their be-
ginning in early April 1994 as the situation in Rwanda was on the Council’s agenda 
anyway because of the UN peacekeeping force UNAMIR. After the death of Belgian 
soldiers Belgium withdrew its UNAMIR contingent. No other country was willing to 
replace the Belgian forces so the Security Council reduced the UNAMIR forces. 
France had repeatedly requested Council meetings on the situation in Rwanda.24 Af-
ter informal consultations, France, supported by other states, introduced a draft resolu-
tion to the Security Council calling for an immediate cease-fire, expansion of 
UNAMIR’s mandate and force level, and an arms embargo on Rwanda in mid-May. 
The draft expressed concern “the continuation of the situation in Rwanda constitutes a 
threat to peace and security.”25  
In June France launched the idea to send an intervention force to Rwanda. French 
Foreign minister Alain Juppé first floated the idea of an intervention on national radio 
and repeated it in a French daily newspaper (Wheeler 2000: 231). Juppé said that France 
was ready to mount an intervention if the massacres were to continue despite of a cease-
                                                 
23  Letter from the US Chargé d’affaires to the President of the Security Council, dated ,S/243946; Letter from the 
Representative of the United Kingdom to the President of the Security Council ,S/24395; Letter from the French 
Chargé d’affaires to the President of the Security Council, dated, S/24394. Solely France highlighted the situation 
in the southern Iraq separately. 
24  Letter from the Representative of France to the President of the Security Council dated 04.03.1993, S/25371; 
letter from the Representative of France to the UN Secretary-General dated 02.04.1994, S/25536. 
25  The draft was adopted as SC Resolution 918 (1994) on 17 May 1994. 
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fire agreed to the day before.26 France officially offered troops for a humanitarian inter-
vention to the United Nations on 20 June 1994. Pointing to evident delays in increasing 
UNAMIR troop levels and the ongoing suffering France asked for Security Council 
authorization for its plans.27 
Kosovo Crisis (Balkan Contact Group) 
The looming humanitarian crisis in Kosovo raised concerns among the Western mem-
bers of the contact group on the Balkans. France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States made up this group. Russia was also a member but rarely agreed 
with the others over the course of action, so the Contact Group acted more and more as 
a group of the five Western members (Teixeira 2003: 15).  
The region mainly populated by Kosovo Albanians was part of Yugoslavia. Until 
1989 the region had enjoyed special autonomy status within the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia but had then been put under Serb administration. Violations of human rights 
of the Kosovo Albanians were reported since. On from summer 1996 the Kosovo Lib-
eration Army (KLA) claimed responsibility for terrorist acts against Serbs in Kosovo. 
The KLA pressed for independence. A claim refuted by Yugoslav authorities and also 
by Western states. At the end of February 1998 the Yugoslav President Milosevic 
started a military campaign against the KLA. Civilians were targeted by both sides lead-
ing to a stream of refugees.  
Threatening sanctions, the United States and the European Union demanded an end 
of the campaign. The contact group prepared a draft resolution calling for a cessation of 
hostilities and a return to the negotiation table and proposed an arms embargo against 
Yugoslavia. The UN Security Council adopted the draft as resolution at the end of 
March.28 Fighting between Serb forces and the KLA continued and gave rise to fears of 
reignited ethnic clashes in the Balkans. In early June the United States shifted policy 
when they called for stronger sanctions against Yugoslavia. British officials also said 
they would move ahead with European sanctions. The United Kingdom also wanted to 
press the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to plan possible military action 
and to push in the UN Security Council for a resolution to approve such a use of force.29 
In mid-June the contact group met with the foreign ministers of Canada and Japan to 
discuss the situation in Kosovo. In their statement they termed the “serious deterioration 
                                                 
26  Agence France-Presse, 15.06.1994: France hints at intervention if Rwanda ceasefire fails. 
27  Letter form the Representative of France to the President of the Security Council, dated 20.06.1994, S/1994/734. 
28  S/RES/1160 (1998). 
29  New York Times, 06.06.1998: A1: U.S. Ready to Resume Sanctions Against Serbs Over Kosovo Strife. 
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[…] a significant threat to regional security and peace”.30 The ministers deplored inter-
ventions by the security forces causing civilian casualties and thousands of civilians to 
flee. They listed several requests – all aiming to stop civilian suffering. Milosevic de-
clared his willingness to enter negotiations with the Kosovo Albanians after consulta-
tions with the Russian President Yeltsin. But Milosevic also said he would not withdraw 
his forces and did not need international mediators.31 Thereby he refused to meet two 
important requests of the Contact Group. Western states stepped up the pressure by pub-
licly talking about military strikes and holding maneuvers in Albania and Macedonia. In 
another reaction, the Contact Group forwarded their mid-June statement to the UN Se-
curity Council. 
 
Turkey and France were the first states to term the Iraqi repression of civilians a threat 
to peace. Turkey, also boasting a Kurdish minority, was worried about possible reper-
cussions for itself. Turkey needed the support of the international community to deal 
with the refugees. France can more easily be seen as genuinely concerned about the 
plight of the refugees. With regard to Rwanda the “humanitarian tragedy” served as a 
pretext for the French intervention. France sought international legitimacy by asking for 
a Security Council mandate. The French offer was not conceived as genuine due to 
French support of the Hutu government. But in the face of lacking alternatives and 
clearly insufficient UN peacekeeping efforts, the French proposal was better than noth-
ing. As in the aftermath of the war on Iraq, the international community was already 
heavily involved in former Yugoslavia and thereby Kosovo. The Western members of 
the contact group were also interested in ending the power struggle with the Serb gov-
ernment. Clearly, concerns other than humanitarian came also into play in all these 
situations. 
5 ENFORCING NONPROLIFERATION 
Nonproliferation as a policy seeks to limit and control the spread of strategic weapons, 
i.e. long-range missiles, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The nonproliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) becomes more and more topical in the Security 
Council. The United States have recently resumed dialogue with North Korea that 
shocked the world in 2005 with its announcement to possess nuclear weapons. Simi-
larly, Western states alerted the Security Council to Iran’s nuclear program in 2006 and 
                                                 
30  Statement on Kosovo issued by the Foreign Ministers of the Contact Group in London, dated 12.06.1998. Trans-
mitted to the UN Secretary-General in a letter from the Representative of the United Kingdom, dated 24.06.1998, 
S/1998/567. 
31  die tageszeitung, 17.06.1998; New York Times, 17.06.1998: A6: Serb's Promises Are Just a First Step, U.S. Says. 
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kept the item on the Council agenda since. In the period under investigation two cases 
fall under the heading of nonproliferation: North Korea’s missile test and the under-
ground nuclear tests by India and Pakistan.  
North Korean missile test (Japan) 
North Korea launched a missile on 31 August 1998 that flew over Japanese territory. 
North Korea had not announced this test of its new multi-stage missile type Taepo-
Dong before-hand. The missile was launched from North Korean territory, crossed Ja-
pan and plunged in the ocean some 500 kilometers of the Japanese Eastern coast. United 
States intelligence had expected the launch, but it surprised Japan. Its effect on Japan 
was comparable to the Sputnik shock suffered by the United States in the late 1950s 
(Kim 1999: 487). The Japanese government assumed the object to be a ballistic missile. 
In principle, this type of missile could reach any target on Japanese territory. Japan’s 
defense policy has long focused on threats from North Korea, even more so since the 
end of the Cold War.  
Japan’s Prime Minister Obuchi protested harshly against the test. “The missile 
launch concerns not only the security of Japan but also the whole of Asia. I will clarify 
Japan's stance in a stern manner, including how we will act in the United Nations“.32 
Foreign Minister Komura lodged protest with North Korea but it was rebuffed by Py-
ongyang which criticized Japan's security pact with the United States. Japan demanded 
that North Korea ceased to develop missiles.33 In the following days Japan decided to 
discuss the launch in its regular tri-partite talks with the United States and South Korea. 
Moreover, Japan suspended scheduled normalization talks with North Korea, halted 
food aid and its share of oil deliveries under the KEDO agreement to North Korea.34 
Japan also cancelled landing permits for North Korean charter flights.35 North Korea 
denounced Japan for „making a fuss over the matter that belongs to our sovereignty 
while being unaware of its background. Japan's behavior is ridiculous“.36 
On 4 September 1998 Japan put its announcement into practice and turned to the UN 
Security Council. Japan emphasized the North Korean missile launch “affects the secu-
                                                 
32  cited by Agence France-Presse, 01.09.1998: World protests North Korean missile firing. 
33  Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Diplomatic Bluebook 1999, www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1999/1-b.html 
[December 2005]. 
34  Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, KEDO, was an agreement under which North Korea would 
cease to produce weapon degree nuclear fuel in exchange for light-water reactors. Until these reactors were op-
erational North Korea was to receive 500.000 tons of oil per year by KEDO members (Long 1999: 336f). 
35  Associated Press Newswires, 02.09.1998: Tokyo Ends charter Flights to Korea. 
36  Associated Press Newswires, 02.09.1998: Tokyo Ends charter Flights to Korea; Crisis Management Criticized. 
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rity of Japan and the peace and stability of the entire north-east Asian regions. Further-
more, it raises a serious concern about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
and their delivery systems.”37 Japan recalled the 1992 Security Council statement that 
declares all WMDs constitute a threat to international peace and security. North Korea 
responded on that day with an official statement that it had tried to launch a satellite into 
orbit (Diamond 1998).38 
South Asian Nuclear Tests (Japan, United States) 
India and neighbouring Pakistan entertain tense relations since their independence and 
have already fought three wars against each other. Intermittently, the situation deterio-
rates to the brink of war. The most contentious issue is the Kashmir region which both 
countries claim should be part of their territory. India is administering the region since 
the division of the former British colony, but Pakistan rests its claim on the region’s 
mainly Muslim population that should be allowed to be part of a Muslim state. India has 
acquired nuclear weapons in the 1970s, Pakistan since the mid-1980s. Both India and 
Pakistan have neither signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTB) nor the Nu-
clear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
In May 1998 India exploded nuclear warheads close to the Pakistani border. India 
tested the first explosion of a run of several tests on 11 May 1998 and concluded its 
tests on 13 May. Shortly after the tests, India announced a unilateral test moratorium.39 
The Indian Home minister L.K. Advani warned Pakistan in light of India's tests, “Is-
lamabad should realize the change in the geo-strategic situation in the region and the 
world [and] roll back its anti-India policy, especially with regard to Kashmir“.40  
The United States and Japan sent delegations to Pakistan to convince the Pakistani 
government not to respond in kind.41 International reactions unanimously denounced the 
tests. Between 11 and 14 May 1998, Security Council members met for informal con-
sultations and prepared a statement. During a formal Council meeting the states en-
dorsed the statement strongly deploring the tests. The Council appealed to India to be-
come a member of the non-proliferation regime and recalled its 1992 statement reading 
“proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international 
                                                 
37  Letter from the Representative of Japan to the President of the Security Council, dated 04.09.1998, S/1998/835. 
38  The attempt had actually failed (even though ITAR-TASS initially reported a Russian observatory had sighted the 
satellite). See also Agence France-Presse, 05.09.1998, N.Korea boasts of satellite, scoffs at world’s mistake. 
39  http://www.ieer.org/ensec/no-6/timeline.html, [06.12.2005]. 
40  The Washington Post, 19.05.1998: A15: Key Indian Official Warns Pakistan. 
41  Reuters News, 13.05.1998: U.S. sends mission to Pakistan on nukes issue; Asahi Shimbun, 19.05.1998. 
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peace and security”.42 Many states, among them Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan and 
the United States, announced bilateral as well as multilateral sanctions by international 
finance institutions against India right after India’s nuclear tests. Mainly economic aid, 
international loans, developmental aid, and sales of military technology were put on 
hold. The United States meant these actions as a warning to Pakistan to demonstrate 
negative effects of India’s tests, too.43  
On 28 May (and again on 30 May) Pakistan also conducted a series of underground 
nuclear tests. The Security Council issues a statement condemning again the Indian and 
the Pakistani nuclear tests.44 States extended sanctions to Pakistan after its tests.45 The 
foreign ministers of the permanent Council members forwarded a joint declaration to 
the Security Council. “The ministers condemned these tests, expressed their deep con-
cern about the danger to peace and stability in the region.“46 Other states including Aus-
tralia, Canada, and New Zealand also alerted the Security Council to the nuclear tests in 
June. These governments were concerned about the “most dangerous consequences for 
regional stability, international peace and security and the international nuclear nonpro-
liferation regime”.47 They asked for a formal Security Council meeting “to consider all 
aspects of this situation at which Member States non-members of the Security Council 
could participate”. 
 
The nuclear tests in South Asia were met by an immense international response. Many 
states alerted the Security Council to the tests and stressed the danger to the interna-
tional nuclear non-proliferation regime. Indeed, non-proliferation was the issue in the 
ensuing Security Council debate. The fact that India and Pakistan periodically stand on 
the brink of war and how such demonstrations of armory could trouble the relationship 
even further was mentioned far less often and only by few states in the open debate. 
Technically, neither India nor Pakistan was violating any international treaty obliga-
                                                 
42  S/PRST/1998/12. The meeting’s sole purpose was to rubber-stamp the statement and lasted only five minutes, see 
record of meeting, S/PV.3881. The 1992 statement referred to is a Presidential declaration, S/23500. 
43  New York Times, 27.05.1998: A1: U.S. Delays World Bank Loans For India in Response to A-Tests. 
44  Presidential Statement, dated 29.05.1998, S/PRST/1998/17. 
45  New York Times, 27.05.1998: A1, 29.05.1998: 10. 
46  Joint communiqué of ministers of foreign affairs of China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States, 
dated 04.06.1998. Transmitted in a joint letter to the President of the Security Council, dated 05.06.1998, 
S/1998/473. 
47  Identical letters form the representatives of Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, the 
Republic of Korea, and Ukraine to the President of the UN General Assembly and of the Security Council, dated 
05.06.1998, S/1998/472. 
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tions. Widespread condemnation of the tests is a sign that most states support the cur-
rent non-proliferation regime and would prefer both states to become part of it. On the 
contrary, Japanese concern about the North Korean missile test was not shared widely. 
Other states may not have felt as threatened as Japan. States probably also took into 
account that China traditionally supports North Korea as well as that the United States 
have kept the North Korean nuclear issue mostly outside the Security Council during 
the early 1990s.48 
6 UNIQUE INCIDENTS 
Some of the identified cases from the 1990s do not fit either of the previous categories. 
A number of states alert the Security Council to incidents that are unique. While there 
are no common characteristics of the situations themselves, these allegations are similar 
in the sense that they were all made at times of tensions. Tensions might stem from a 
single contentious issue or might be of an almost fundamental nature. These incidents 
are less an indication of a developing international crisis but rather of already tense rela-
tions between the complaining state and the state blamed with threatening international 
peace.  
Forced inspection of vessel (Cuba) 
On 30 January 1990 the US coast guard fired on a vessel in the Gulf of Mexico. That 
incident occurred only days after Cuba had alleged the United States to have attacked 
Cuban troops in Angola.49 The vessel was operated by a Cuban crew and hired by a Cu-
ban company, but registered in Panama flying the Panamanian flag. The US coast guard 
assumed the vessel was smuggling narcotics or other contraband and wanted to search 
the boat. The vessel’s Captain denied permission for the search and continued its 
course. The US coast guard pursued the vessel and eventually fired at it to force the 
vessel to stop. The coast guard then searched it. 
Cuba first sent a protest note to the United States and then asked for a Security 
Council meeting. Cuba complained about the harassment of and attack on the merchant 
ship. “[This] constitutes not only a flagrant violation of the norms of international law 
[…] but also an act of piracy endangering international peace and security.”50 The 
United States responded with an account of their view of the events. While providing 
                                                 
48  The issue of North Korean nuclear capabilities has been on the Council agenda, but the issue has been dealt with 
mostly in bilateral and multilateral negotiations outside the Council that resulted in the KEDO agreement. 
49  New York Times, 26.01.1990. 
50  Letter from the Representative of Cuba to the President of the Security Council, dated 02.02.1990, S/21120. 
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this account the US government expressed the view that the “Security Council should 
not expend its valuable time considering this matter which in no way constitutes a 
thereat to international peace and security.”51 
Nuclear Threats to Korean Peninsula (North Korea) 
North Korea perceived itself threatened by the Unites States at the beginning of 1990. 
Technically, both countries are still at war because they have not concluded a peace 
treaty formally ending the Korean War (1950-53). Especially US nuclear capabilities 
and the extension of its nuclear umbrella over the US ally South Korea worried North 
Korea. Since 1976 South Korea and the United States annually hold joint maneuvers 
dubbed ‘Team Spirit’. North Korea felt extraordinarily threatened by these maneuvers 
(Kang 1995: 261, Michishita 2003: 72) and regularly voiced its anxiety that this “nu-
clear war game” could turn into an attack on North Korea. 
On the other side, the United States ranks North Korea as potential aggressive and 
expansionist state. In the US view, the threat emanates from North Korea which it sus-
pects to develop nuclear weapons since the 1980s. Although North Korea uses nuclear 
energy since the 1950s it did not become a member of the NPT until 1985, and then 
only because of Soviet pressure. Part of NPT regime are so-called safeguards measures 
which regulate international inspections of nuclear facilities by the International Atomic 
Energy Organization (IAEO). Initially North Korea did not conclude safeguards agree-
ments. While the US view is widely shared and dominates the international debate, only 
the North Korean threat perception is of interest in this paper. 
At the end of February 1990 North Korea alerted the UN Security Council to the 
forthcoming Team Spirit maneuver. North Korea pointed out the armory, including nu-
clear arms, most likely to be used. It called Team Spirit “a preliminary war, a test nu-
clear war designed to deal a pre-emptive strike” at North Korea. Its staging is “a grave 
challenge to our peace-loving Republic and the entire Korean people and a criminal act 
threatening peace in Asia and the rest of the world”.52 North Korea underlined its com-
plaint about the joint maneuvers and its quest for American security guarantees as 
timely now that the Cold War was over. In November of that year North Korea sought 
again to involve the Security Council in the matter. It laid out its position not to con-
clude safeguards agreements as long as it not received a US security guarantee in re-
                                                 
51  Letter form the Representative of the United States to the UN Secretary-General, dated 03.02.1990, S/21122. 
52  Letter from the Permanent Observer of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the President of the Security 
Council, dated 27.02.1990, S/21171. 
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turn.53 Again, North Korea emphasized the nuclear threat posed by the United States and 
recalled its proposal for nuclear-free Korean peninsula made in 1986 and 1989. 
US military cooperation with Israel (Libya) 
The background to Libya’s complaint from June 1991 is its tense relationship to the 
United States and Israel. Longstanding tensions with the US arose from differences over 
relationships to Israel and the Soviet Union, Libya’s sponsorship of terrorist activities 
and Libya’s oil policies (Zoubir 2002: 32). After the victory over Iraq the Bush admini-
stration started to define its ‘new world order’. At the end of May 1991 President Bush 
unveiled a proposal for arms limits in the Middle East. The plan’s centrepiece called for 
curbing sales of conventional weapons to the region and banning non-conventional 
weapons.54 Less than 24 hours later, the US announced to ship ten additional F-15 
fighter jets to Israel.55 As a result of the Gulf crisis Israel had received extra military and 
economic aid on top of the annual US$ three billion in the preceding months. Part of the 
additional aid was US weaponry stockpiled in Israel for emergency use by either Israel 
or the US.56 Earlier in May Israel had requested specific US weapons for stockpiling on 
its soil.57 Next to arms sales to Israel, the administration announced further major weap-
ons transfers to the region, including to Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. 
In the light of these announcements, Libya turned to the UN Security Council. In its 
letter Libya complained about the US policy of “double standards” apparent in announc-
ing arms limitation in the Middle East and a new programme for military cooperation 
with Israel. “This agreement and this policy represent not only a threat to the peace and 
security of the Arab nation but a threat to international peace and security.” Libya called 
upon the UN “to assume the duties and responsibilities conferred on it under the Charter 
with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security.”58 
Anti-Libyan campaign (Libya) 
Tensions between Libya and the United States prompted another complaint by Libya to 
the UN Security Council. This time US-American claims that Libya perpetrated the 
                                                 
53  Letter from the Permanent Observer of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the President of the Security 
Council, 16.11.1990, S/21957. 
54  New York Times, 30.05.1991: A1; Washington Post, 30.05.1991: A1. 
55  Washington Post, 31.05.1991: A3. 
56  Washington Times, 20.05.1991: A1. 
57  Washington Post, 20.05.1991: A1. 
58  Letter from the Libyan foreign minister to the UN Secretary-General, dated 18.6.1991, S/22718. The letter in-
cluded the request to be circulated as document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council. 
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Lockerbie bombing were the cause. On 21 December 1988 a bomb exploded on board 
of a US-American airplane over the Scottish town Lockerbie. All passengers as well as 
people on the ground lost their lives. Since summer 1991 two Libyan intelligence ser-
vice officers were the prime suspects for the crime (Boyd-Judson 2005: 79). The United 
Kingdom and the United States considered the bombing not only as a criminal act but as 
an act of state terrorism. In November 1991 Scottish and US-American authorities 
brought criminal charges against the suspects. They demanded the officers’ extradition 
for trial, of the Libyan government to take responsibility for the bombing and to fully 
cooperate with the investigations as well as payment of compensation.59 
The British foreign minister Douglas Hurd pointed out in a speech before the British 
Parliament that the destruction of the plane was alleged to involve government organs.60 
Similar statements by the US White House also stressed Libya’s alleged responsibility 
for the bombing “It's impossible for us to believe that the [Libyan] government was not 
involved and that this is not a case of state-sponsored terrorism.”61 
Libya denied these charges and alerted the UN Security Council to these allegations 
in November 1991. In a first response Libya rejected any connections to the bombing 
and knowledge of it by Libyan authorities. It requested an impartial international fact 
finding commission, or alternatively that the charges should be tried by the International 
Court of Justice.62 Some days later – in an extraordinary defense strategy – Libya ac-
cused the United States of breaching the UN Charter. “Such official statements by the 
United Sates Department of Justice, the official spokesman for the White House and the 
British Foreign Secretary indicate a premeditated intention of and a carefully considered 
plan for aggression against the Libyan people. […] The United States has accused Libya 
[…] with the premeditated intention of engaging in aggression in order to change the 
popular democratic regime by force thereby violating the provisions of the Charter of 
the UN prohibiting the threat or use of force […].”63 In the same letter to the UN Secre-
tary-General Libya recalled earlier US interventions in Libya’s internal affairs and the 
US bombings of Tripoli and Benghazi to support its claim of a premeditated campaign 
against its government. 
                                                 
59  Joint Declaration of the United States and the United Kingdom, dated 27.11.1991 and forwarded to the UN Secre-
tary-General on 20.12.1991, S/23308. 
60  The Guardian, 15.11.1991: 2. 
61  Marlin Fitzwater, White House Press Secretary, cited in the Washington Post, 15.11.1991: A1. 
62  Letter from the Representative of Libya to the President of the Security Council, dated 15.11.1991, S/23221. 
63  Libya made this accusation first in a letter from its Representative to the UN Secretary-General, dated 
20.11.1991, A/C.1/46/23, with regard to the agenda of the UN General Assembly. The same letter was circulated 
without any changes as document of the Security Council on Libyan request, now dated 13.01.1992, S/23416. 
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Aegean dispute between Greece and Turkey (Greece) 
The relationship between Greece and Turkey is strained among other things by a dispute 
over their Aegean Sea border. The disputed border is delimited by the Lausanne Treaty 
from 1923. Each country’s territorial waters extend to six nautical miles; the remainder 
of the Aegean waters are open to shared use by both coastal states. The Greco-Turkish 
dispute over their Aegean border flared up again when the Third United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) entered into force in 1994. That event led to 
fears of a militarized conflict between Greece and Turkey as Turkey had threatened war 
should Greece extend its territorial waters.64 
Under UNCLOS a coastal state is entitled to territorial waters extending twelve nau-
tical miles from its territory. If Greece would apply this provision, Greece would control 
nearly three quarters of the Aegean Sea. Turkey would only gain direct control about 
one additional percent of the Aegean. Greece has signed UNCLOS, but Turkey has not. 
Turkey argues the Aegean Sea should be treated as a semi-enclosed sea to which differ-
ent legal rules apply for border delimitation. Greece and Turkey also differ about the 
nature and number of issues related to the Aegean dispute. While Greece views only the 
delimitation of its continental shelf to be at stake, Turkey has a much larger list of is-
sues.65 
In June 1995 Greece ratified UNCLOS. It also reserved the right to extend its territo-
rial waters to twelve nautical miles in line with the treaty but not with immediate ef-
fect.66 Turkey renewed its position that such extension would be cause of war and re-
sponded with military manoeuvres.67 Even though the Turkish foreign minister stated 
Greece ratifying UNCLOS was not a cause of war per se, on 8th June 1995 the Turkish 
parliament adopted a resolution authorizing the Turkish government to take all neces-
sary steps, including military ones, to protect vital Turkish interests.68 There was no 
doubt the resolution meant Greek extension of its territorial waters in the Aegean Sea. 
Greece immediately announced to take the Turkish threats to the United Nations, 
NATO, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Greece 
alerted the UN Secretary-General to the Turkish threats on the next day. Greece claimed 
                                                 
64  Financial Times, 03.10.1994: 3; Reuters News 14.11.1994; Financial Times, 17.11.1994: 3. Thanks to the inter-
vention of US and European Diplomats there was no clash in November 1994, Portland Oregonian, 20.11.94: 
A10. 
65  For the Turkish view on the issues involved see http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Regions/ 
EuropeanCountries/EUCountries/Greece/GreeceLinks/The_Aegean_Problems.htm [24.01.2006]. 
66  Reuters News, 31.05.1995: Greek Parliament approves treaty extending waters. 
67  Reuters News, 01.06.1995: Greece says Turkey's Aegean exercise a provocation. 
68  Reuters News, 08.06.1995: Turkish parliament gives cabinet war powers. 
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that resolution constituted a direct violation of article 2, 4 of the UN Charter. Moreover 
Greece complained “Turkey is seeking the deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations, 
thus creating dangerous implications for peace and stability in the region”.69 Over the 
next month, both Greece and Turkey send further letters on the Aegean dispute to the 
UN criticizing their respective positions. 
Bombing of chemical plant (Sudan) 
In August 1998 the United States bombed a chemical plant in Sudan (and purported 
terrorist bases in Afghanistan). The attacks were retaliation for the bombing of US em-
bassies in Kenya and Tanzania earlier that month. Since 1993 the US have declared 
Sudan a sponsor of state terrorism and imposed additional sanctions on Sudan in 1997.70 
In 1998, the US claimed the Sudanese factory was helping Osama bin Laden to develop 
chemical weapons. Sudan maintained the plant had produced pharmaceutical drugs. 
On 20 August 1998, the day of the bombings, the United States informed the UN Se-
curity Council that it “has exercised its right of self-defense” in accordance with Article 
51 of the UN Charter.71 The US pointed out it had carefully sought to minimize collat-
eral damage. 
The next day Sudan requested an urgent Security Council meeting “to take its re-
sponsibility under the Charter of the United Nations by condemning this barbarous and 
iniquitous aggression and holding the United States responsible”.72 Sudan pronounced 
the US accusations and actions “drags modern society back to the laws of the jungle 
governed solely by the logic of force whereby each State is intent on taking the law into 
its own hands, a situation which will ultimately threaten international peace and secu-
rity”. It also rejected the US justifications as “naïve, illogical and baseless since [Sudan] 
has not committed any action that could be regarded as an attack or a threat against the 
United States”. Sudan asked the Security Council to send a fact-finding mission. The 
Arab League and the Group of Islamic Nations backed Sudan’s position.73 Until the end 
of the year, Sudan continued to provide statements and information on the matter and 
repeatedly asked for a Security Council meeting. 
                                                 
69  Letter from the Greek Representative to the UN Secretary-General, dated 09.06.1995, S/1995/476. 
70  See http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/fs/2008/103970.htm [13.05.2008]. Additional sanctions in 1997 were also justi-
fied with Sudan’s alleged sponsorship of terrorism and suppression of the Christian population. 
71  Letter from the Representative of the United States to the President of the Security Council, dated 20.08.1998, 
S/1998/780. 
72  Letter from Representative of Sudan to the President of the Security Council, dated 21.08.1998, S/786. 
73  Statement by the Secretariat of the League of Arab States, dated 21.08.1998, S/1998/789; letter from the Repre-
sentative of Qatar to the President of the Security Council, dated 21.08.1998, S/1998/790. 
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These six incidents point to another reason for states to involve the Security Council. 
States use the Security Council to draw attention to (alleged) wrongdoings of their ad-
versary. In this sense, turning to the Council is a way of venting opposition to a certain 
state and its foreign policy. Apparently states do so if their relations to the alleged state 
are already strained. Not all of these unique incidents are obvious threats to international 
peace and security. Cuba’s protest against the forced search of a vessel by the US coast 
guard springs to mind. Other complaints are more easily recognizable as security 
threats. For instance, Greece drew the Council’s and thereby the international commu-
nity’s attention to Turkish threats against itself. At the same time, states put forward a 
certain interpretation of these events – again not always likely to be accepted by many 
other states. Libya accused the United States of planning to topple the Libyan regime by 
charging Libyan intelligence officers with the Lockerbie bombing. While this view was 
at no point likely to be shared by many other states, it is a low-cost and simple way for a 
state to spread its view in the international community. It’s noteworthy that especially 
‘outsider states’ like Libya and North Korea make use of this avenue. 
7 CONCLUSION 
The internationalization of security concerns remains a patchy process. While states 
bring a surprisingly wide range of issues before the Security Council they do not draw 
the Council’s attention to every crisis. There were far more crisis situations in the 1990s 
that would have fitted easily into the categories introduced in this paper but states did 
not term those a threat to peace.74 States use the Council as one way to internationalize 
their security concerns. Some states make more use of this avenue than others.  
The case descriptions above give some background of the circumstances in which 
states complain to the UN Security Council. They also highlight what kind of situations 
states term a threat to international peace. In some cases, states use the Council as an 
arena to organize collective response to norm violations. This behavior is well in line 
with the UN Charter’s purpose to provide for the maintenance of international peace by 
outlining a system of collective security. In other cases, however, states simply use the 
Security Council to voice discontent with another state’s policy. The latter cases are 
more puzzling than the former. They suggest states want the Security Council to be a 
place to advertise their grievances, too. In all instances, states turn to the UN Security 
Council to make their view on a situation public. Broadly speaking there are two events 
that trigger state complaints to the Security Council: immediate threats and threats to 
community norms. Both assumptions find empirical support. 
                                                 
74  The conclusion obviously generalizes findings of the empirical instances studied in this paper. No other crisis 
situations that involved an OECD country were termed threats to peace. 
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An immediate threat perception stems from a previous verbal or physical attack. 
Such situations are marked by two things. The state alerting the Security Council is di-
rectly involved in the crisis and the complaining state perceives itself under attack. For 
example, when the United States bombed a Sudanese chemical plant in August 1998, 
Sudan complained to the Security Council about US aggression against itself. In a lot of 
other instances, this does not mean that military force has actually been used against the 
complaining state. The perceived attack might be a small incident, but is more likely 
another state’s foreign policy strategy affecting the complaining state. Often the com-
plaining state’s relation to the state accused of threatening behavior is strained by previ-
ous controversies. Official statements or state policies are then under special scrutiny 
and more likely to prompt complaints. In this sense, turning to the Security Council is a 
way to expose the wrongdoing of a state’s adversary. Most immediate threat perceptions 
analyzed in this paper stem from unique incidents, only one case relates to non-
proliferation of WMDs (see table below). As pointed out before, primarily states that 
are outsiders of the international community brought such immediate threats before the 
Council.  
The other event is a threat to shared norms of the international state community, i.e. 
threats to ius cogens norms (e.g. genocide) or other fundamental principles of interstate 
conduct that can only be upheld collectively (e.g. non-proliferation). In these instances 
the complaining state is usually not directly involved in the respective crisis. The com-
plaining state is most likely not only alarmed of the violation itself but also seeking to 
underline the violated norm’s validity. While a single violation of fundamental norms 
will not invalidate the norm, a precedent might be set. Norm violators will give in most 
instances reasons for the violation, either arguing while a certain norm was not applica-
ble in the special case or justifying the violation with reference to distorted facts (Franck 
2006: 96). For example, very many states perceived nuclear tests in South Asia in 1998 
as a threat to the international non-proliferation regime and therefore alerted the Secu-
rity Council to these tests. States turn to the Security Council to discuss - and possibly 
refute - the given justification by the norm violator, thereby contributing to a shared 
understanding of the norm in question. Threats to community norms stem mainly from 
wars/military interventions and humanitarian crises caused by intrastate conflicts. Mili-
tarized conflicts clearly violate the prohibition of the use of force in international rela-
tions and in some cases, for instance US intervention in Panama, also the norm of non-
intervention in domestic affairs. In the 1990s, the international community reacted to 
protect human rights and humanitarian relief operations in Northern Iraq, Rwanda and 
Kosovo. There is an increased international willingness to act, albeit selectively, on the 
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humanitarian impulse.75 Noteworthy is the finding that mainly Western states show 
themselves alarmed over threats to community norms. 
Table1: States alarming the Security Council 
 Immediate Threat Threat to Community Norms 
War  
Nicaragua 
United States and others 
Canada, Austria, Hungary 
Austria, France 
Humanitarian  
Crisis  
France, Germany 
France 
France, Germany, Italy, UK, USA 
Enforcing  
Non-proliferation Japan Japan, United States and others 
Unique Incidents 
Cuba 
North Korea 
Libya (2 cases) 
Greece 
Sudan 
 
 
In sum, in the instances under investigation states most often turned to the UN Security 
Council to denounce a specific action by another state (six cases) in the 1990s. The 
complaining state perceived itself under immediate threat in all these unique incidents, 
though not all raised allegations appear as threats to international peace to an observer. 
Prime example of this behavior is the complaint by Cuba against the United States. In 
two instances, states expressed their concern to the Council about proliferation issues. 
One of these concerns stems from an immediate threat perception, the other one from a 
threat to the international nonproliferation regime. Roughly the other half of state com-
plaints to the Security Council was triggered by threats to community norms. States 
drew the Council’s attention to wars and in other incidents to humanitarian issues 
caused by fighting. 
The fast evolving UN practice of humanitarian intervention, i.e. intervention to pro-
tect human rights and end civilian suffering, responded to these (and other, more infor-
mal) calls by states. Here, the interconnection between state concerns and Security 
Council actions can be seen well. On the one side, there are states terming certain ele-
ments of crisis a threat to international peace and on the other side, the Security Council 
including such statements in its resolutions as happened in relation to civilians in North-
                                                 
75  For an excellent, if somewhat bitter, discussion of the ‘humanitarian impulse’ see Weiss 2004. 
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ern Iraq.76 UN practice in turn advanced the notion of international human rights protec-
tion and fostered an extended understanding of ‘threat to peace’. 
Some generalizations about reasons for states to turn to the UN Security Council can 
be derived from this study. States alarm the Council in order to: 
 create publicity (e.g. Cuba’s complaint about a forced search of a vessel) 
 lend protest more weight (e.g. Nicaragua’s protest against US military inter-
vention in Central America) 
 criticize an adversary (e.g. Libya’s allegation of double standards on US 
weapons sales) 
 shame another state by drawing attention to its actions (e.g. Greece exposing 
Turkey’s threats of war) 
 demonstrate a commitment to a certain norm (e.g. protesting against nuclear 
tests by India and Pakistan demonstrates commitment to nuclear non-
proliferation) 
 organize a collective response (e.g. to oust Iraq from Kuwait) 
 seek support and/or legitimization for an intended action (e.g. France’s pro-
posal to intervene in Rwanda)  
The question remains what states gain from turning to the Security Council. While this 
is not a main concern of this paper, some brief remarks are in order. Alarming the Secu-
rity Council to crisis - even calling the crisis a threat to peace - is no guarantee to place 
that situation on the Council’s agenda. Not all of the instances which states perceived as 
threats to international peace were actually discussed in the Council. Complaints about 
unique incidents were the least successful to lead to a formal Council meeting. Only 
Cuba’s complaint was discussed during a formal Council debate. Cuba and the United 
States were the only speakers. The Sudanese protest was dealt with in informal consul-
tations among Council members but delayed indefinitely.77 North Korea achieved the 
opening of official dialogue with the United States, but it is hard to say if that was a 
direct result of alarming the Security Council. Libya’s complaints were ignored, and so 
were the Greek allegations. The Japanese concern about the North Korean missile test 
was circulated in the Council’s backrooms and there was a press statement by the 
                                                 
76  Security Council resolution 688 (1991) explicitly takes note of the Turkish and French letters and reflects these 
states’ concerns in finding the situation a threat to international peace. 
77  Assessment of the Work of the Security Council during the Presidency of Slovenia und Assessment of the Work 
of the Security Council during the Presidency of Sweden, www.globalpolicy.org/security/presreps/index.htm 
[08.05.2007]. 
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Council’s president, but never a formal meeting.78 Regarding the two assumptions on 
the nature of the threat it seems to be the case that raising an immediate threat is of little 
interest to the Security Council. On the contrary, drawing attention to threats to com-
munity norms was rewarded by formal Council meetings in all cases. Most issues even 
led to more than one meeting and a collective response to the threats raised was organ-
ized in all cases. Responses ranged from rather mild verdicts as the denunciation of the 
South Asian nuclear tests combined with the demand to join non-proliferation treaties 
over the imposition of arms embargos to the authorization of the use of force.  
May be the state that turns to the Security Council might not even expect the Council 
to take action. At the same time, the opposite seems to be true for a far larger group of 
states. States might very well refrain from alerting the Council, if they do not anticipate 
international support for their concerns. This is indicated by the low number of in-
stances in which states draw the Council’s attention to threats to peace. Another indica-
tion is the fact that states increasingly coordinate their response before they turn to the 
Security Council. If they do so, states do not bother to formally alert the Council to a 
threat to peace. For instance, in the Haiti crisis in the early 1990s, it was the semi-
formal ‘Group of Friends’ made up from Canada, France, the United States and Vene-
zuela that coordinated international response and prepared draft resolutions for later 
Security Council approval (Malone 1998). Further research would benefit from includ-
ing instances from the four clusters that were not brought by a state to the Security 
Council. Contrasting crisis situations which prompted states to turn to the Council with 
those that did not would complement the picture. 
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